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Should we use recombinant DNA techniques to 
create pigs genetically engineered to suit the preferences 
of fanners and consumers? 
In 1982, scientists injected a rat growth hormone 
gene into the chromosome of a mouse. The resultant 
animal expressed the rat gene and quickly grew to twice 
its parents' size.! In 1985, researchers at the United 
Slates Department ofAgriculture hoped to attain similar 
results by inserting a human growth hormone gene into 
the chromosome of a pig. At the Agricultural Experi-
ment Station in Beltsville, Maryland, experimenters 
successfully microinjected the piece of DNA encoding 
the production of human somatotropin into the nucleus 
of a fertilized pig egg. The extracted embryo was 
reimplanted into a sow's uterus; the pregnant animal 
came to term; and the fIrst piglet in history with a human 
gene was bom. 
The Beltsville research program was not aimed at 
producing hogs twice the size of their parents but at 
producing more cost effective swine, pigs that would 
convert grain into lean meat faster than their parents 
while eating proportionately less grain. Such animals 
would be a boon to certain sectors of the agricultural 
economy, including most of the pork industry, some 
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hog farmers, and many meat consumers. The industry 
might cut costs by slaughtering fewer animals per pound 
of meat; farmers might reduce expenditures on 
feedgrains while continuing to sell the same amount of 
pork; and consumers might benefit from industry and 
farm savings passed on to them at the meat counter. 
Nineteen transgenic swine lived through birth and 
into maturity. Several expressed elevated levels of the 
growth gene, but none grew more quickly or to greater 
size than their counterparts in the control group.2 
However, many suffered from "deleterious pleiotropic 
effects," medical problems not afflicting the controls.3 
Those animals developed abnormally and exhibited 
deformed bodies and skulls. Some had swollen legs; 
others had ulcers, crossed eyes, renal disease, or 
arthritis.4 Many seemed to suffer from decreased 
immune function and were susceptible to pneumonia.s 
All were sterile. Later, researchers concluded that if 
transgenic swine were to be produced as successfully 
as transgenic mice, "better control of transgene 
expression, a different genetic background, or a 
modifIed husbandry regimen" would be required.6 
Further experiments are underway. 
Is the research program at Beltsville morally 
justified? Your answer will probably tum on your 
answer to three related questions. Do you think 
individual adult, nonhuman mammals have interests, 
in a morally relevant sense? If so, do you think it is 
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prima facie wrong, in the same way if not to the same 
degree, to deprive an animal of living conditions in 
which its basic biological needs can be met, just as it is 
prima facie wrong to deprive a human of living 
conditions in which its basic biological needs can be 
met? That is, do you !llink we should presume !llat 
deprivation is wrong unless we have reason to believe 
otherwise? Finally, do you think efficient production 
of livestock is an important social value? 
Take l1le last question first. New and more efficient 
techniques for l1le production ofmarket hogs could have 
substantial economic benefits, including a national hog 
population bred to convert feed into meat wil1l great 
efficiency; hog breeders, farrowers, finishers, and 
consumers reaping financial benefits from l1le animals' 
efficient digestive tracts; and comparative economic 
advantages for American farmers facing competition 
from other countries. Notice that the gain in social utility 
here is not simply a gain in productivity but a gain in 
l1le efficiency of l1le use of resources, including human 
and plant resources as well as animal resources. 
Depending on how heavily you weigh such gains, you 
might believe l1le gains will outweigh l1le costs associ-
ated wil1ll1le suffering of the nineteen transgenic swine. 
But will l1ley? To answer l1lis question we must 
decide how much weight to assign to l1le animals' pain. 
Start wil1l an easier case. Suppose l1le experimental 
animals in question were human beings. Imagine l1lat 
!lIe only way to achieve !lIe financial gains was to 
transfer swine growl1l hormone genes into fertilized 
human embryos, implant l1le embryos in women, bring 
l1le embryos to term, raise the resultant nineteen children 
to maturity, and then transfer l1le children's somatou'opin 
genes back into the swine. Suppose further that tile 
children in question had sickly malfonned bodies 
analogous to l1le bodies of l1le Beltsville hogs. Clearly, 
the social benefits in this case, even if they were 
dramatic and sustained, could not be pelmilled to out-
weigh the costs. Any who would entertain l1le possibility 
l1latl1le pain and suffering of children may be justified 
by gains in economic efficiency of pork production are 
morally callous, or worse. We should not bring children 
into l1le world to use as means to economic ends, so 
experimenting on human embryos, wil1lout knowing 
what effects !lIe procedures will have on l1le children 
l1le embryos will become, is at least irresponsible. 
We should not approve a line of reasoning l1lat would 
justify l1le production of Beltsville humans because of 
economic gains in agricultural production efficiency. 
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Of course, you may object, the experimental animals 
are hogs, not humans, and it is not apparent l1lat we 
owe hogs what we owe humans, namely, l1le duty not 
to be treated as economic pawns. By way of response 
to this objection, I start with the obvious fact that all 
living things have basic biological needs (BBNs). BBNs 
vary by species and, perhaps, even by individual. But 
in all cases, BBNs are needs l1lat must be met if an 
individual's welfare is not to be I1lwarted. 
What are some typical human BBNs? To be able to 
ingest sufficient amounts of uncontaminated protein and 
water without undue pain; to be able to eliminate bodily 
wastes without wasting half l1le day doing it; to be able 
to maintain sufficient psychological equilibrium l1lat 
we are able to fall asleep at night; to have access to 
sufficient open space that we can accelerate our hean 
rates to one hundred odd beats per minute for half an 
hour three times a week; to possess a backbone and 
neck muscles strong enough that our heads do not need 
external support; to have an immune system not 
vulnerable to common air borne viruses. 
Ifwe are born wil1l a medical condition that deprives 
us of the ability to have one of our basic needs met, we 
are the worse off for it, but we cannot necessarily say 
someone has harmed us. If, on l1le ol1ler hand, our 
unfortunate condition is the result of someone's having 
injured or deprived us, or having injured l1le fertilized 
egg we once were, then l1le offending person has harmed 
us, done us a moral wrong. I will call11lis principle (1): 
(1) It is (morally) wrong to deprive an individual of 
somel1ling it must have if its BBNs are to be met. 
Notice it is A who is wronged, and not someone or 
some!lling else. This means l1latthe principle can only 
apply to beings wil1l a welfare that may be promoted or 
harmed. There are, of course, many !llings in l1le world 
without welfares, and such l1lings cannot be directly 
harmed. Examples include natural objects, like 
mountains and piles of sand, and human artifacts, like 
bridges and computer printers. You might harm the 
owner or user of these l1lings by mishandling l1le object, 
but you cannot harm !lIe object, because natural objects 
and artifacts do not have a good of their own. So (1) 
does not apply to things, because things are not 
individuals, do not have biological needs, lack intrinsic 
value, and have no good or welfare of l1leir own.? 
Individuals are animated beings, beings l1lat exhibit 
goal-directed behavior in which l1le goal or principle 
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of movement is internal to the being. Humans are 
individuals, but fingers are not; hogs are individuals, 
but a serumwith hog growth hormone in it is not; tomato 
plants are individuals, but their fruit is not. Here an 
obvious problem with (1) surfaces. If the principle were 
true, we could notjustifiably sever the head of a cabbage 
from its root in order to eat it. So doing would deprive 
an individual A, the cabbage, of something A needs in 
order to have its basic biological needs met.8 I trust our 
common intuition here, that killing cabbages in order 
to feed ourselves is morally permissible and, more 
generally, that there are many individuals, including all 
onions and cabbages, toward which we do not possess 
even a prima facie duty not to deprive them of things 
they need to have their BBNs met. 
What distinguishes individuals that may be killed 
from individuals that may not be killed? 
I think it is, roughly speaking, consciousness, by 
which I mean the capacity to take an interest in things 
in your future. I understand "the capacity to take an 
interest" in the way many others have: S has the capacity 
to take an interest in X if and only if S has feelings of 
well-being that may be affected by X.9 Obviously, 
cabbages are not conscious in this sense, because they 
lack feelings. I feel confident that cabbages lack feelings 
because they lack the hardware necessary to have 
feelings, namely, a brain or a central nervous system. 
Lacking feelings, they lack the capacity to take an 
interest in things in their future, or even to have a future. 
Thus, individual A in the plant kingdom may justifiably 
be deprived of something it must have if its BBNs are 
to be met because, even though that individual has 
BBNs, it does not have consciousness. Having no 
feelings, no capacity to take an interest in things in its 
future, it cannot be harmed by depriving it of a future. 
It is not morally wrong, even prima facie, to kill plants 
on the grounds that we thereby directly hann them. 10 
We must amend (1), tllerefore, to accommodate the 
claim that it is not always prima facie morally wrong 
to kill individuals. laffer, then, (2): 
(2) It is prima facie (morally) wrong to deprive a 
conscious individual A of the tllings it must have 
if its EBNs are to be met. 
Combining (2) with 
(3) The Beltsville experiments deprived individual 
hogs of things they need to have their BBNs met, 
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and 
(4) Hogs are conscious individuals, 
gives the conclusion, 
(5) It was prima facie (morally) wrong to deprive 
the Beltsville hogs of tlle things they needed to 
have their EENs met. 
Now, some will want to contest (4) and argue that 
pigs are not conscious individuals. Ifpigs are more like 
bridges, Le., human artifacts, than like children, then 
we can no more harm a pig by unintentionally breeding 
it to have a bad body tllan we can harm a bridge by 
unintentionally designing it to lack earthquake 
sustaining power. On the dominant view in Western 
cultures of nonhuman animals, animals are more like 
human artifacts, with instrumental value only, than like 
human beings, with intrinsic value. But pigs are clearly 
different from bridges, not anIy because they can move 
tllemselves around, experience pain and pleasure, and 
lead social lives, but also because there are things pigs 
must have in order to have their BBNs met. If a pig's 
bone structure is unable to bear its weight, if its sensory 
systems are unable to give it reliable information, if its 
immune functions fail to protect it from common 
diseases, then the pig will lead a deprived life, unable 
to engage in the goal-directed behaviors characteristic 
of its species. It will, variously, not be able to eat or 
mate or root or play with or care for its young or 
establish a social order or investigate its environment. 
The pig itself will fare poorly ifit does not have the 
things it needs to have its BBNs met. If scientists 
engineer pig embryos tlmt develop into individuals with 
deformed bodies or poorly developed brains, they have 
harmed the pig. Whether they do this intentionally or 
unintentionally should bear on how much culpability 
we assign to the scientists, but it should not affect the 
question of whether tlle pigs themselves have been 
harmed. So this objection to (4) fails. 
Again, one might grant that pigs are individuals and 
have BBNs, but insist tllat pigs are unable to take an 
interest in anything that may affect their future well-
being. If so, then they, like cabbages, are not conscious 
individuals, and so cannot have a right not to be deprived 
of tllings they need to have their BBNs met. I believe 
this criticism is wrong, and I will argue that pigs are 
able to take an interest in some things. But I want to 
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avoid the language of animal rights, because the 
tradition of rights tnlk is inimical to the sort of moral 
attitudes I wish to encourage. Rights talk encourages 
us to think of the moral sphere as an arena of atomistic 
units warring with each other to defend turf against 
invaders. I want to encourage views of the moral sphere 
in which individuals are construed more interde-
pendently, engaged in projects tlmt are more cooperative 
than competitive. But I must confess that I have a 
difficult problem, to avoid the individualism of rights 
language without tearing down the legal and 
philosophical fence around individuals which rights 
language has so admirably erected. I think the way to 
do this is to try to show that the notion that "it is wrong 
to deprive a being that can take an interest in having its 
BBNs met of the things it needs to have its BBNs met" 
is a primitive notion. That is, while you can give 
examples of the wrong that obtains when an individual 
is deprived, you can do nothing more by way of giving 
reasons that it is wrong than telling stories. There is no 
further justification that can be offered for why it is 
wrong to deprive an individual, but, fortunately, there 
is no further justification needed. Let me explain. 
Ethical reflection means giving reasons for our 
judgments. When we say x is wrong, others are 
justified in asking us why we think that. When we 
give a reason, that reason may be fonnulated as a 
general moral principle. But our parUlers may want to 
know why that principle is u'ue, and may justifiably 
ask us to ground our reasons for our decisions in some 
more basic, ultimately vindicating, reason. The work 
of ethics proceeds this way, with claims being 
grounded in reasons, and reasons in principles, and 
principles in theories. 
But the dialectic of etllics does not go on forever; at 
some point we reach what is, for us, the true, ultimately 
vindicating ground of our reasoning. When we reach 
this ground, others will ask us why we rest on that 
ground, and we may be tempted to try to provide a 
reason. We should resist this temptation, because, if we 
have truly reached bedrock, there is nothing further for 
us to say. Wittgenstein once remarked that the most 
difficult part of justification in philosophy is to 
recognize a justification as a justification, and to stop. 
I can tell you why I think hogs are individuals, and 
I can tell you why I think hanning individuals by 
depriving them of the basic things they need is morally 
wrong, and I can give you examples of cases I tllink 
involve harm to individuals and cases I think involve 
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no harm to individuals. But I cannot tell you why I 
think harming individuals is· morally wrong. If you 
tell me that you see no moral wrong in harming 
individuals, I have three responses open to me. I can 
first ask you if you are serious, and try to decide 
whether I think you are speaking in good faith. If! 
decide you are serious, I can; second, tell you stories 
of deprivation. If after several rounds of stories, told 
in increasingly graphic detail, I decide that you are 
still serious about the claim that you see no moral 
wrong in harming individuals, then I have no option 
but to decide that you have not been brought up in the 
right way, and that you may be. dangerous. i 
My claim is that the following idea is a ,primitive 
notion, which reasonable persons, once they under-
stand it, must accept: "To harm an individual by 
depriving it of things it needs to have its BBNs met is 
prima facie morally wrong." If I am correct, then I 
can use this primitive notion in place of rights talk. 
That is, wherever philosophers have justifiably 
ascribed a basic "right" to r in order to underscore the 
importance of some entitlement an individual has, or 
some duty others have toward the individual, I want 
to say tllat reasonable persons brought up correctly 
who understand what it would mean to deprive the 
individual of ralso understand and accept the primitive 
notion that "depriving the individual of r is primafacie 
morally wrong." And that is all we can say, or need to 
say, about the matter. 
If the argument about primitive notions works, I 
can offer a strong protection for individuals without 
recourse to rights talk. And that would allow us to show 
why we have strong duties not to deprive conscious 
beings of things they need to have their BBNs met. As 
Michael Tooley has shown, you cannot have a right to 
something unless you are capable of taking an interest 
in it.l! You cannot take an interest in something unless 
you are conscious. Thus, only conscious beings, which 
is a subset of the class of all individuals, are candidates 
for the strong protections traditionally fonnulated in 
rights language. So it remains for me to say why I think 
hogs are conscious. 
My reason for thinking hogs can take an interest in 
something is the same as my reason for thinking my 
four-month-old daughter can take an interest in 
something. In my daughter's case, my belief is based 
on inferences drawn from observations ofher behavior. 
I remember watching Krista's eyes follow a mobile 
slowly turning over her Clib. Her lids would open slowly 
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after her nap, wander around tlle room, and then fix on 
the motions above her. I surmised she was "taking an 
interest" in the mobile because her eyes would 
sometimes stray toward me, but she would shut out tlle 
distraction, even as I strained to get her attention, 
focusing once again on the revolving colors. 
In the hog's case, my belief is based on similar 
inferences. I say to my uncle, an Iowa farmer, "That 
old sow really took an interest in the tire we threw in 
there." When I say "took an interest," I mean it in exactly 
the same sense I apply to my daughter. Consider the 
behavioral signals each gives, tlle level of visual and 
mental focusing going on, and tlle kinds and grounds 
of inferences I make on Ule basis of UlOse signals. All 
of tllese things are identical in Ule two cases. I see Ule 
hog's eyes open as the tire sails in; I see the animal 
slowly rise to face Ule foreign object; I watch as he 
cautiously approaches it, snorting and backing at 
irregular intervals. I surmise, as I watch him spend the 
rest of the morning intently nosing the tire treads, 
oblivious to me and to his pen mates, that his attention 
has been captured by the tire. What more simple or 
elegant or efficient explanation is there than to say, "the 
pig has taken an interest in" the object? 
This point, being the crux of my argument, bears 
underscoring with other examples. Boars can take a 
monogamous interest in a single gilt coming into heat, 
in a knot hole knocked through a pine board, and in Ule 
bristles of anoUler pig's back. They can take an active 
interest in people, and tiley can, if tile Hollywood animal 
trainer Frank Inn is to be believ~ take an active interest 
in ignoring people. Inn reportedly said: 12 
You can force a dog, a chimp or a horse to do 
something, but a pig, no. Pigs won't take 
punishment. Reprimanding will work with a 
dog, but with a pig, never. If you reprimand a 
pig he won't like you, won't respond to you 
and won't even take food from you. You can 
see temper in pigs. If I scold tilem, they scold 
right back.13 
If an individual has the capacity to take an interest 
in something, it must be capable of losing interest in 
sometlling, too. We usually lose interest when we 
become bored, when the thing occupying our attention 
no longer intrigues us. That happens when sometlling 
that once intrigued us no longer presents new 
opportunities or facets La our imagination. Our 
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imaginations, of course, are not infinitely plastic, and 
Ule Ulings that will continue to engage our fancy over 
a long period of time fall within limits drawn by our 
genetic background, social upbringing, and profes-
sional training. 
Pigs can lose interest in things. In one experiment, 
hogs were trained to carry coins from one end of their 
pen to the other, and to deposit them in a bank. 
Researchers found that the animals quickly progressed 
to a stage where the animals would carry four or five 
coins before needing reinforcement. As they put it, "Pigs 
condition very rapidly," or, as I would prefer to put it, 
pigs have a tremendous capacity for becoming 
interested in things. But, being intelligent, pigs also have 
a high threshold of boredom. Unless a new object or 
behavioral stimulus has some relationship to the basic 
wants and drives of a pig, we can predict that the pig's 
interest will wane. In a development that could only 
have been surprising for scientists committed to a 
particular paradigm, that is what happened in tilis case. 
After a period of several weeks, the experimental 
animals stopped performing the chore Uley had been 
"conditioned" to do. 
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This particular problem behavior developed 
in pig after pig, usually after a period of 
weeks or months, getting worse every day. 
At first the pig would eagerly pick up one 
dollar, carry it to the bank, run back, get 
another, carry it rapidly and neatly, and so 
on, until the ratio was complete. Thereafter, 
over a period of weeks the behavior would 
become slower and slower. He might run over 
eagerly for each dollar, but on the way back, 
instead of carrying the dollar and depositing 
it simply and cleanly, he would repeatedly 
drop it, root it, drop it again, root it along the 
way, pick it up, toss it up in the air, drop it, 
root it some more, and so on. 14 
The researchers described the pig's actions as 
"problem behavior" resulting from a breakdown in 
"conditioning." We might describe it more accurately 
by calling it a natural loss of interest in objects and 
stimuli not consistent with the pig's basic biological 
needs and basic biological wants. The pigs, being pigs, 
were more interested in rooting the coins than in 
putting them in tlle bank. The behaviorists' conclusion 
bears citing: 
We thought this behavior might simply be the 
dilly-dallying of an animal on a low drive. 
However, the behavior persisted and gained 
in strength in spite of a severely increased 
drive-he finally went tllrough tlle ratios so 
slowly tlmt he did not get enough to eat in 
the course of a day. Finally it would take tlle 
pig about 10 minutes to transport four coins 
a distance of about 6 feet. This problem 
behavior developed repeatedly in successive 
pigs... [We concluded] tllat these particular 
behaviors to which tlle animals drift are clear-
cut examples of instinctive behaviors having 
to do with tlle natural food getting behaviors 
of the particular species. IS 
To call the pigs' behavior "instinctive," of course, 
begs the question of whether tlle animals are beings 
with mental powers comparable to those of, say, a 
human infant. An alternative explanation is that tlle 
hogs' behaviors were clear-cut examples of this 
species' ability to take an interest in, and then to lose 
interest in, novel environmental conditions. In saying 
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this, I intend the phrase, "take and lose interest in," 
in exactly the same sense I intend when I use it of 
my daughter. 
Hogs can take an interest in things in their 
environment, and so they have a future. They not only 
have BBNs, but they have a welfare, a good, that may 
be promoted or harmed. It is a primitive notion that it 
would be morally wrong to harm an infant by depriving 
itofthe things it needs to have its BBNs met. In exactly 
the same way, it is a primitive notion that it is morally 
wrong to harm a pig by depriving it of things it needs 
to have its BBNs met. 
Even if the moral wrong at Beltsville was done 
originally not to adult animals but to ova, and even if 
the harm was unintended, those facts should no more 
cause us to say that the animals themselves were not 
wronged than we should say the girl an embryo will 
become is not wronged by unintentional harm resulting 
from manipulating the ovum she was at the embryonic 
stage. It was wrong for the Beltsville scientists to 
engineer pig embryos for the reasons officially 
circulated, and it is morally indefensible for them to 
continue the research program without reasons of a very 
different sort.16 
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